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CASH PRIZES FOR INTELLIGENT WRITING ON INTELLIGENCE
PRESENTATION OF AWARDS FOR 1978
May 31, 1979

The officers and Board of Directors of the National Intelligence Study Center (NISC) take pride in announcing the presentation of our first annual awards for "intelligent writing on intelligence."

Almost a year ago NISC announced that it would award a prize of \$1,000 for the best book, \$500 for the best scholarly article, and \$500 for the best journalistic writing by a U.S. citizen on the subject of the role of intelligence in U.S. national decision-making and security. Published or unpublished manuscripts produced during the period January to December 1978 were reviewed by a NISC committee chaired by Professor Jules Davids, Georgetown University, and Adjunct Professor Walter Pforzheimer, Defense Intelligence School.

The purpose of these awards -- and of NISC itself -- is to foster a better public understanding of the historical role and current functions of our intelligence agencies and of the vital contribution made by the intelligence community to national policymaking, defense, arms control, and the maintenance of peace.

In recent years the intelligence agencies have been under intense criticism, some of it warranted, but much of it including serious distortions. A better understanding of intelligence is needed at all levels -- policymakers in government, academia, and the general public. NISC is dedicated to encouraging enlightening study of the real issues of maintaining an effective national intelligence system in our free society.

For this first year, 1978, the committee and the NISC Board decided to

split the prize on the book award. Thus there will be two authors present to receive the cash prize, Allen Weinstein, author of Perjury, a book on the Hiss case, and Joseph E. Persico, author of Piercing the Reich, a book on the German clandestine operations program of the Office of Strategic Services. They will receive \$750 each.

An additional award will be given to Richard K. Betts of the Brookings Institution, whose scholarly article, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable," appeared in World Politics, 31, No. 1 (October 1978). Unfortunately, Mr. Betts is unable to be present on this occasion, but a colleague of his will accept for him the award of \$500.

The awards committee did not believe that any newspaper articles in 1978 were worthy of an award; so that money was added to the amount set aside for the book award and two prizes are being given, as indicated.

During the past few years there has been much published on intelligence in the journals of this country, both scholarly and popular. Much of this writing has been bad -- biased, polemic, or ill-informed. There has also been some good writing, however, and we believe the proportion of thoughtful, constructive articles is increasing. In making awards to encourage this trend, we have used the criteria of objectivity, realism, and sound command of the facts and we have asked, "What contribution does the article make?"

As the best article on intelligence produced in 1978 we have selected "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable" by Richard K. Betts in World Politics, October, 1978. Dr. Betts is a Research Associate at the Brookings Institution. This article of Dr. Betts' looks realistically at the problems of intelligence production and presentation and of its appreciation and correct use by the overworked policy-maker. Dr. Betts looks at the various proposals for improving the system which have followed each major failure in the production or use of intelligence and shows why none of the proposals has been able to achieve more than a slight improvement. Whether one chooses to call the study "pessimistic" or "realistic," it is a highly useful contribution to the literature of intelligence.

The National Intelligence Study Center is pleased to award this check for \$500.00 to Richard K. Betts. As Dr. Betts is out of the country, it is being received on his behalf by Dr. Ernest Evans, who is also a Research Associate at the Brookings Institution. Not incidentally, Dr. Evans' research

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specialties also include a subject of high interest to NISC,
terrorism.

Dr. Evans it is a pleasure for me to present this
award check to you for passage to Dick Betts on his return.

Allen Weinstein

The National Intelligence Study Center has undertaken the presentation of an annual award to an American author of the best book, finished in 1978, on some important aspect of intelligence in the United States.

The Awards Committee and the Board of Directors were faced with two books of comparable merit which they felt should be properly recognized; and that is their final decision. Thus we are announcing two winners, one of which is a remarkable work of detailed scholarship, the book entitled Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case by Professor Allen Weinstein, at the time of writing Professor of History at Smith College. It presents in depth a record of Soviet intelligence penetration in the United States in the 1930s and details the story of internal security investigation into the Hiss case in the 1940s in a way that throws light on American counter-intelligence processes.

Through the use of the Freedom of Information statutes, Dr. Weinstein was able to extract literally thousands of formerly classified FBI and Department of Justice documents, as well as many more from other useful sources. By personal interviews -- some with people who had never previously discussed the case openly -- the author has made an enormous contribution to the history of a major case in American intelligence history. To this he has added meticulous study of the already published records, including the Congressional hearings. In the end, his researches led him to the inevitable conclusion he said he came to reluctantly that justice had been done.

In announcing this award, we can only re-emphasize that we feel we are honoring a book and its author -- both in the finest tradition of detailed research and scholarship within the subject for which these awards are, for the first time, being made.

JOSEPH E. PERSICO, PIERCING THE REICH: THE PENETRATION
OF NAZI GERMANY BY SECRET AGENTS DURING WORLD
WAR II

Comments: Jules Davids at Book Award Ceremony
May 31, 1979

As an historian on American Diplomacy and Strategic Policies at Georgetown University, I have often told my students that American Foreign Policy is only as good as the intelligence upon which it is based, both in the broad and narrow meaning of intelligence. This, in turn, depends upon the perceptive analyses and interpretations of the people who evaluate intelligence data. Although intelligence officers are constantly engaged in gathering and evaluating information, in the final analysis, the determination of policy decisions rests with the President of the United States.

The United States has had, throughout much of its history, an aversion to intelligence. Before World War II, it was largely identified with spying, and secret, nefarious operations--activities which it was believed had no place in a free and open society such as the United States.

The first attempt to develop an organized intelligence system occurred in World War I. In September, 1917, shortly after America's entry into the war, Woodrow Wilson approved the creation of a unique, secret organization, called "The Inquiry." Its major tasks were to collect data, documents, produce reports and studies, prepare maps, and compile bibliographies, among other things. In effect, "The Inquiry" became a research enterprise, whose functions were specifically directed to the general field of intelligence.

The conception of intelligence in terms of systematic fact finding, and the mobilization of academic talent for intelligence work from major American universities, was something new, and for the United States revolutionary. The information compiled during the fifteen months of the Inquiry's existence was astounding. The initial staff of five persons was enlarged to about 150. The group amassed significant data on almost every country and region in the world. To be sure, Wilson did not take proper advantage of this material at the Paris Peace Conference. Information accumulated on Russia, for example, and conclusions drawn from this data were ignored. Piles of documents remained in unopened crates. If President Wilson had adequately briefed himself on the Inquiry's reports, perhaps the results of the Paris Peace Conference might have been more salutary to the United States and to the world. We will never know.

The Inquiry was disbanded after the opening of the Paris Peace Conference. A number of key individuals and experts from the Inquiry went to Paris as members of the American Advisory Commission. During the inter-war years, intelligence activities were once again given a low priority. This neglect proved to be detrimental to the United States. The inferiority of American intelligence on the eve of World War II was

pitiful, and made the United States, to a large degree, dependent on Great Britain.

To remedy this situation, William "Wild Bill" Donovan persuaded President Franklin D. Roosevelt to establish, in 1940, the office of the Coordinator of Information, and then subsequently the Organization of Strategic Services (OSS). This organization, in essence, became the successor to the Inquiry. Like the Inquiry, it was a remarkable organization, that brought together an assemblage of unique individuals, which included not only Americans but persons from many foreign countries who joined the Allied cause.

Joseph Persico's Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents during World War II discloses a phase of OSS operations that was not previously known. With the release of CIA classified documents, and other documents secured under the Freedom of Information Act, Mr. Persico has been able to demonstrate how OSS finally reached, in the last months of the fall of the Reich, a level of competence that was comparable, and, perhaps, even superior to British intelligence.

I found Piercing the Reich a gripping book. Persico describes graphically numerous individuals, whom we get to know personally. In many instances, their experiences were harrowing. Their dedication and bravery during wartime were also of heroic dimensions. Persico vividly details the critical importance of training, the collection of information--no matter how mundane--and the precise purposes of missions. He also adds significantly to our own knowledge of OSS operations, and historically to the final phase of World War II in Europe, and to the methods used to penetrate the Reich. Persico's resourcefulness and ingenuity in tracking down 122 persons associated with various missions, and in putting together the whole story connected with Piercing the Reich are impressive and commendable.

The significance of the OSS operations is summarized by Persico. "America's entrance into secret warfare had been a late but brilliant flowering," he says. And he adds: "The United States achieved in less than four years what other nations had developed over centuries. The recruitment, documentation, and dispatch of nearly two hundred agents into the most terrifying police state ever known marked the highest peak of proficiency achieved by OSS during the war and demonstrated a capacity for secret warfare equal to that of any other nation. The performance was acknowledged by British intelligence--never sanguine about penetrating Germany--as remarkable. OSS had infiltrated three times as many agents out of England alone into the Reich as had the British. The American architects of the German operations later regretted only that they had not started earlier, when the harvest of intelligence could have been even richer. The piercing of Nazi Germany clearly ranks among the great espionage triumphs of World War II.

I wish to congratulate Mr. Persico for his richly absorbing book. It gives a clear insight into the operations of the OSS in Germany; it gives a comprehensive picture of life in Germany in the final stages of the war; it reveals fascinating information about the Mauthausen concentration camp not previously well known; and it is well written. In my opinion, Piercing the Reich is eminently worthy of the National Intelligence Study Center's book award.